This paper introduces and formally models the variable value environment, where bidders private values may change over time as a result of both private actions and exogenous shocks. Examples of private actions and exogenous shocks are complementary investments and exogenous changes in bidder's business, respectively. We study mechanisms that lead to e cient allocations, i.e. those in which the nal value of the object to the winning bidder net of the total cost of private actions undertaken by all agents is maximized. We characterize the rst best allocation, and propose a mechanism that yields the rst best allocation in equilibrium. This mechanism has an ine cient pooling equilibrium along with an e cient separating equilibrium. To rule out the pooling equilibrium, we introduce a class of almost e cient mechanisms that force players to coordinate on the separating equilibrium.
Introduction
If an object is available for use at some future date, what is an e cient mechanism for selling it? For example, consider a sale of a hypothetical military base that is scheduled to close in twenty years. Waiting with the sale for twenty years and auctioning o the base immediately before it becomes available probably creates an ine ciency, because the winning bidder might have missed opportunities to invest in assets complementary to the base ownership. In other words, private actions that a bidder chooses prior to the actual sale may in uence her private value. If a bidder thinks that her likelihood of winning the object is su ciently low, she would choose not to take costly actions that increase her valuation of the object. 1 On the other extreme, selling the base twenty years before it becomes available seems absurd, because the expected value of the object for each bidder is likely to change over time. Thus, e ciently allocating an object a long time before it becomes available for use is an unlikely possibility. In other words, as long as there are privately observed exogenous shocks to private values that are revealed over time, auctioning o the object well in advance (before the exogenous shocks are observed) may be ine cient.
Changes in private values due to private actions and exogenous shocks are ubiquitous. We will refer to an auction environment, where individual values may change over time as a result of both private actions and exogenous shocks as the variable value environment. Private actions, for instance complementary investments, change the private value of an object; and so do exogenous shocks ranging from changes in demand and input prices to changes in tax laws and regulatory environment. A sale of almost any object or service available for use at some known future date is an example of the variable value environment, ranging from leasing a building or a military base to renting a dance club for New Year's Eve.
A sale of an object in a market where search is important inevitably has elements of the variable value environment. Consider the sale of house A that is scheduled to be auctioned o in 20 days. Before house A becomes available bidders may have opportunities to buy other houses, essentially removing themselves from the market. Thus, we can consider an action consisting of \not buying some other reasonably priced house" as an action that boosts the value of the house. A second price auction (or any other single-round auction mechanism) is bound to be ine cient in a market with search because in the variable environment information revelation is necessary for achieving e ciency. The model of the variable value environment not only explains why auctions are rare in markets where search matters, the theory of the variable value environment developed herein also o er insight into auction design for these markets. 2 One may argue that as long as there is resale opportunity the object should be auctioned o as early as possible and then \the market will allocate it e ciently". However, this argument is awed on two counts: First, in a generic case, there exists no e cient resale mechanism (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) . Second, and most importantly for the current analysis, selling the object early counting on the original buyer to re-allocate the object simply moves the burden of designing an allocation mechanism from one party to the other. To the best of our knowledge, a variable value environment has never been introduced or investigated in the economic literature. The time dimension central for the variable value environment is essentially absent from the auction literature. Although in many auction models bidders use bid history for updating their beliefs, this does not introduce time dimension into the auction environment. Indeed, the multi-period updating is due to a mechanism selected for the auction, and it is the process of the auction that in uences the bidders values in these models and not the passage of time. An auction where participants bid for packages of goods in multiple rounds is another example of an auction where a time line is a part of the mechanism but not a part of the auction environment (for a recent example of such a mechanism, see, e.g., Milgrom, 2000, Perry and Reny, 1998) .
Auctions with entry costs are related to the variable value environments: Mathematically, decision to pay for costly entry into an auction is equivalent to an action that boosts the private value of the agent. However, there is a number of signi cant di erences. Most importantly, an entry fee is a feature of the mechanism, rather than of the environment. In contrast, ability of agents to take actions in uencing the value of the object is a feature of the environment. Entry costs are investigated in various contexts by Milgrom (1981) , McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Riordan and Sappington (1987) , Levin and Smith (1994) , Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Lixin Ye (2000) .
The present work attempts to o er insight into auction design for the variable value environment. We start by proposing a formal model of the variable value environment with three periods. In the rst period, each party receives a private signal s about its private value for the object. In the second period, a party can take a private, unobservable action at cost c (cost) that increases the value of the object by b (bene t). In the third period, bidders receive independent exogenous shocks t to their private values of the object. For ith bidder, the nal reservation price for the object is a function of signals (s i and t i ) regarding the value obtained in the rst and third periods plus the bene t b from taking an action if the bidder took the action (V (s i ; t i ) + b c). Otherwise, the private value of the object is V (s i ; t i ). The identity of the bidder with the highest value can only be established after the third period signals t i are observed. Thus, an e cient allocation mechanism requires that the ownership of the object is assigned after the third period. Conducting a second price auction after the third period is not e cient (in a world where rst period signals are privately observed), since it forces agents to take decisions regarding second period actions in ignorance of the expected private values of other agents. The following example illustrates this simple but essential point.
Example. Let the number of participants be N = 2; assume that s i are privately observed signals independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [0; 1]. For simplicity, assume that there is no third period signal, t i 0: 3 In a symmetric equilibrium with no revelation of 3 In the special case of all t i 's equal to zero; an e cient allocation rule can be implemented by assigning the ownership of the object by conducting a Vickrey auction at the end of the rst period after s i 's are privately learned. Also note that for any non-degenerate distribution of third-period signals, assigning the ownership of the object at the end of the rst period is no longer e cient. Of course, the ine ciency of allocating the object at the end of the third period demonstrated by the example does not go away when t i 's are not equal to zero. the rst-period signals, each agent acts if her probability of winning conditional on her own type is higher than c b : That is, agent i acts if s i s = c b : If s = 3 4 , then with probability 1 16 both agents act (which is ine cient), and with probability 9 16 no agent acts (which is ine cient as well). Therefore, on average there are too few actions ( 1 2 instead of 1). If s = 1 4 , the situation is reverse: with probability 9 16 both agents act, and with probability 1 16 no agent acts. On average, there are too many actions ( 3 2 instead of 1). This is hardly surprising: without signaling, there are too few actions, when actions are relatively costly ( c b = 3 4 ), and there are too many actions, when actions are relatively cheap ( c b = 1 4 ). We consider a problem of designing an e cient mechanism for allocating the object in the environment where signals about bidder's private values (s i , and t i ) are private signals. First, the concept of allocation needs to be generalized for the variable value environment. For the variable value environment an allocation is de ned as the identity of the bidder who receives the object and the list of private actions taken by bidders. The objective of the social planner is to implement an e cient allocation, i.e. to maximize the social surplus, which equals to the expected sum of all bidder's surpluses net of the cost of actions. After the social planner observes the rst-period signals s i obtained by bidders, she has to decide which bidders should act in the second period and which should abstain from actions. Since the exogenous shock of the third period is not known in the second period (when decisions to take actions are made), it may be e cient to have more than one bidder taking an action or to have no bidders at all taking actions. 4 Theorem 1 establishes that if the social planner orders an agent with the rst-period value s i to act, then she also orders all agents with value greater than s i to act.
Of course, an all-knowing and well-intentioned social planner is rarely available in the real world. What happens if there is no social planner but all the information is common knowledge, i.e. signals obtained by a bidder about her private value are observed by all players? Theorem 2 establishes that the e cient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized case. (This is the same rst-best allocation that can be achieved by the social planner.)
The above mentioned results rely on bidders' private values being common knowledge. A more realistic case, where bidders privately observe their valuations, is of primary interest.
Can an e cient allocation be achieved in that case? It is straightforward that an e cient allocation can not be attained without revelation of bidders' private signals (s i ) prior to the second period. If the object is allocated to the bidder with the highest value following the third period (using, say, a second price sealed bid auction) adding a cheap talk stage following the rst period will not result in any information revelation and thus would lead to an ine cient outcome (allocation). 5 In the cheap talk stage each bidder would claim to be`the high type' because the higher is the perceived type of a bidder, the less likely are the other bidders to undertake actions and thus the lower are the subsequent bids for the object by other players. Theorem 3 and Theorem 5 show that there exists an e cient mechanism, where private information is revealed in the rst round and the object is assigned in the second round. The rst round takes place after private signals s i are received by agents. In the rst round bidders reveal their private signals s i by making payments (we show that the higher is the private signal s i ; the higher is the agent's willingness to pay for reporting to other agents that the value of her private signal s i is high). The second round consists of a second price sealed bid auction conducted after signals t i are received.
As long as private signals s i are truthfully revealed in the rst round, the subgame corresponding to the second round is identical to the complete information game. Theorem 3 establishes that the mechanism described above has an e cient separating equilibrium. Unfortunately, this mechanism also has an ine cient pooling equilibrium. To rule out the pooling equilibrium, we propose a class of mechanisms that force players to coordinate on the separating equilibrium. We refer to mechanisms from this class as \" e cient mechanisms." We prove that one can always choose an " e cient mechanism which yields an e cient allocation with probability arbitrarily close to one. An " e cient mechanism consists of two rounds. The rst round takes place after private signals s i are received by agents: a non-transferable discount for amount " is sold via a sealed-bid all-pay auction. After the all-pay auction all bids are made public. The " discount can only be used in the second round auction. In the second round the object is sold using a Vickrey auction (if the winner of the Vickrey auction is a holder of the " discount, she pays the second highest bid minus "). Note that for " = 0 this mechanism is identical to the e cient mechanism described above. Theorem 6 shows that an arbitrarily small positive " forces agents to coordinate on a separating equilibrium that yields an e cient allocation with probability converging to one as " converges to zero. In spirit, this mechanism is very close to virtual implementation, a pure theoretical concept in mechanism design (e.g., Maskin and Sjostrom, 1999) . The proposed mechanism could easily be used in real large-stake auctions, so it gives a rst example of a real-world implementable virtual implementation mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the formal model of the variable value environment. In Section 3, an e cient mechanism that has a fully separating Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is described. Section 4 introduces the " e cient mechanism and establishes that it has a unique robust equilibrium. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains mathematical details and proofs.
The Environment
The variable value environment is an environment, where bidders' expected value of the object changes stochastically over time. This paper focuses on a three period model: it is the simplest possible model that exhibits essential features of the variable value environment, and o ers insights into auction design in such an environment. There are N identical agents. In the rst and the third periods, agents receive independent signals about their private values of the object. In the second period, each agent has an opportunity to take a costly action that increase her private value of the object.
Timing
Period 1. Each agent receives a signal s i 0 about her private values, drawn independently from the same atomless distribution: Period 2. Each agent i has an opportunity to take an unobservable action, i.e. choose a i 2 f0; 1g; which increases the agent's private value by ba i and costs ca i 0 (obviously, only the case of b > c is of interest). When a i = 1 we say that the agent i undertakes the action or simply`acts'; if a i = 0 we say the agent i abstains from acting or skips the action. To explore possibilities of e ciently allocating the object within the model, we need to extend the concepts of allocation, e ciency, and social surplus to the variable value environment. Social surplus is the value of the object to the agent that gets the object minus the cost of actions taken by all agents: S = V (s j ; t j ) + ba j P N i=1 ca i ; where j is the identity of the agent that receives the object. An allocation is a vector consisting of the list of agents who took actions and the identity of the agent who received the object. An allocation needs to specify the identities of agents who took actions because actions a ect the social surplus. An equilibrium strategy pro le of a mechanism (e.g., an auction) is referred to as an allocation rule. If a mechanism has multiple equilibria, each equilibrium strategy pro le de nes an allocation rule.
Any allocation rule induces a probability distribution over values of social surplus induced by a mechanism or by a social choice rule adopted by the social planner. Allocation rules can be ranked in terms of e ciency by comparing corresponding expected values of the social surplus. An allocation rule is e cient ( rst-best), if it yields the same expected social surplus as the maximum expected social surplus that can be achieved by the social planner, who observes all signals received by agents, orders agents to take or not to take actions, and, nally, assigns the object.
E cient Mechanism in the Variable Value Environment
In this section, we study mechanism design in the variable value environment. We start with considering a benchmark case of the e cient mechanism for allocating the object that can be achieved by a social planner who knows all the private information available to bidders. Then we consider a mechanism that allocates the object e ciently in the incomplete information case.
The Social Planner's Problem
Let us start by characterizing the solution to the social planner problem. After observing the rst period signals, the social planner decides which agents should act in the second period. Formally, there is a mapping of a vector of the rst period signals into a vector of the second period actions a = a (s). 8 At the end of the third period the social planner assigns the object, thus mapping a triplet of vectors (s; a; t) into a number between 1 and N. The nal assignment of the object is easily characterized. The social surplus maximization calls for assigning the object to the agent with the highest ex-post private value: if the e cient allocation assigns the object to the agent j; then for any i 6 = j; we have V (s j ; t j ) + ba j V (s i ; t i ) + ba i . Thus, assigning the object before agents have learned their nal values of the object is likely to be ine cient. Obviously, in the variable value environment, giving the object to the agent with the highest ex-post value is necessary, but not su cient for e ciency. It remains to characterize the function a (s) that describes the second period actions needed to maximize the expected social surplus, given s. So, the social planner's problem might be written as follows:
Before proceeding to general results, let us illustrate this problem with a simple example.
Example. This is essentially a continuation of the Example from the introduction. Suppose that N 2: If there is no third-period uncertainty (t i 0), then the social planner chooses exactly one agent to act { the one with the highest rst-period signal. On the other extreme, if there is no rst-period signal (s i 0); and the cost of action is su ciently cheap, then the social planner would assign all agents to act.
It is useful to introduce a function G i (s; a i ) representing the di erence in the expected social surplus that results from the agent i acting and not acting (keeping the actions of other agents unchanged):
(1)
Since the social planner maximizes social surplus, the expected surplus in the above formula should be computed under assumption that after the third period, the social planner allocates the object to the agent with the highest value. The social planner faces the following tradeo : each additional agent's act increases the expected private value of the agent who receives 9 r is determined almost uniquely: The event that the expected social surplus is maximized by more than one action vector of the form a(r ) and a(r ) where r 6 = r has zero probability.
Complete Information
Now we turn to a world without an all-knowing and well-intentioned social planner. We consider the case, where agents act non-cooperatively, given that the rst-period signals are common knowledge. This is an essential step towards mechanism design for the incomplete information case. One might expect that in the decentralized case too many or too few players may take actions, since they may not fully internalize the e ect of their private actions on other players. We show that an e cient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized case, when bidders know each other's rst-period signals. Theorem 2 states that in this case there exists an equilibrium outcome of a second price auction conducted at the end of the third period that yields an e cient allocation, the same allocation as the rst best obtained by the social planner.
Theorem 2 If rst-period signals s are public knowledge, there exists a socially e cient Subgame Perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a second price sealed bid auction conducted at the end of the third period. In this equilibrium, agents take unobservable actions as if they were assigned by the social planner resulting in the allocation rule characterized in Theorem 1.
The basic intuition is as follows: the expected increase in an agent's utility from taking an action is exactly equal to the change in the expected social surplus due to her action. 10 Then the fact that a(r ) is the social planner's optimal choice ensures that a(r ) is an equilibrium vector of actions in the non-cooperative game.
Proof of Theorem 2. We introduce a function g i (s; a i ) de ned as the change in the expected utility of the agent i as a result of taking an action instead of skipping it, and prove the following assertion (a proof is in the Appendix).
Lemma 2. g i (s; a i ) = G i (s; a i ). Now observe that if a is a solution to the social planner's problem, then G i (s; a i ) 0 when a i = 1 and G i (s; a i ) 0 when a i = 0: Indeed, if G i (s; a i ) < 0 when a i = 1, the agent's i switch from acting to non-acting would strictly increase the expected social surplus, contradicting the choice of a: Similarly, G i (s; a i ) 0 when a i = 0: Then Lemma 10 The logic behind the result is similar to the one that insures e cient entry in McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Smith (1994). 2 asserts that for the change in private bene ts we have g i (s; a i ) 0 for agents that act, and g i (s; a i ) 0 for others: Thus, no agent has incentives to deviate, and Theorem 2 is proven.
Here and in the rest of the paper the term`equilibrium' is reserved for a subgame-perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. The e cient equilibrium described in Theorem 2 seems to be a natural focal point. However, the game has a coordination component: there are other Bayesian equilibria that are not e cient. For example, if there are only two players, there might be two equilibria: one with the highest-ranked agent acting and the other abstaining, and another one with the second-ranked agent acting and the highest-ranked abstaining.
Incomplete Information: Ex-post E cient Equilibrium
Now we are ready to investigate the incomplete information case. Here we consider a threeperiod model of the variable value environment similar to the one considered in the preceding section. The only di erence is that here bidders' signals regarding their private values (s and v) are observed privately. Now a mechanism consisting of an auction conducted after the third period no longer leads to an e cient allocation, since under such mechanism agents take second-period actions without knowledge of the private signals obtained by other players. 11 Obviously, an e cient allocation rule can not always assign the nal ownership of the object prior the end of the third period.
Is it possible to allocate an object e ciently in the variable value environment of incomplete information? This question is answered a rmatively by Theorem 3. We explicitly construct an e cient allocation mechanism, which consists of two rounds: The private information is revealed by announcing it in the rst round that takes place after the rst-periodprivate-signals are observed; the ownership of the object is assigned in the second round that takes place after the third-period private signals are observed by bidders.
Rounds of the E cient Mechanism:
1.a Part a of the rst round takes place at the end of the rst period (after the private signals s have been received by agents). In part a of the rst round, all agents make simultaneous public announcements b s i about their private values s i . 1.b Part b of the rst round immediately follows part a. Each agent voluntarily selects a payment amount, h i 0; that depends on the announcements of other agents, as well as on her own announcement. (These payments h i (b s) are necessary to make announcements credible.) 2. The second round takes place at the end of the third period, after agents observe their private signals t i : In the second round, the ownership of the object is assigned using a second-price sealed-bid auction.
Theorem 3 There exists a subgame perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the Signaling Mechanism that yields an e cient allocation rule.
Proofs of Theorem 3 and all subsequent results are relegated to the Appendix. Here, let us discuss the logic behind the result. First, note that if the rst period signals are revealed truthfully, the remaining subgame is identical to the game where rst-period signals s are common knowledge. Theorem 2 established that an e cient allocation is an equilibrium of that game. Consequently, in order to establish existence of an e cient allocation mechanism, it su ces to show that for some payment schedule h i (b s); truthful reporting is an equilibrium, when agents anticipate that the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 2 will be played in the remaining subgame. The intuition behind the possibility of truthful revelation is as follows. The higher is the rst period signal s i received by an agent i; the higher is that agent's relative willingness to pay in order to signal that her value of s i is high. Agents are willing to pay in order to reveal their rst period signals, because this information discourages other agents from taking actions, thus increasing the probability of winning for the agent i and decreasing the expected price that she will pay for the object (in the subsequent second price auction) conditional on winning. The expected price decrease a ects agents with di erent private values di erently. For instance, someone with a very low rst-period signal is unlikely to win the object, thus her willingness to pay for sending a signal that depress the price of the object is lower than that of an agent with a relatively high rst-period signal about her private value. This observation, which is critical to the existence of a separating signaling equilibrium, is formalized in Lemma 3. This Lemma establishes an appropriate analog of the increasing-di erences property (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) 
Note that nding h(ŝ i ; s i ) that satis es the above constraints is su cient for proving the claim of Theorem 3. Such payment schedule h i (ŝ i ; s i ) is characterized in Theorem 4.
Before proceeding to Theorem 4, we need to introduce one more de nition.
Consider the e cient allocation rule characterized in Theorem 1. 
is de ned to be the minimal type of i such that exactly k highest-ranked agents (di erent from the agent i herself) act in the subgame equilibrium described in Theorem 2. Let k i = k i (0; s i ) be the number of agents acting, when i has the lowest possible type (zero). Within each segment described above, an agent's i report is irrelevant to the other agents' decisions on whether or not to act. Proof of Theorem 3. Lemma 3 proves that the above payment schedule induces truthful reporting by agent i, provided that all other agents' reports are truthful. The beliefs supporting the equilibrium in the signaling stage are straightforward: if a payment by an agent i is de ned by (3), then the agents rst-period signal is perceived to lie within the respective range. In the subgame that starts after the rst-period signals are revealed, agents play according to the strategies described in Theorem 2.
In the above equilibrium, each agent reports her type truthfully regardless of the other agents' types given that these types are reported truthfully. 12 This is a kind of an ex-post equilibrium (Perry and Reny,1999) , where no agent regrets her announcement after learning the other agents' types; thus, this mechanism is similar in spirit to the well-known VickreyClarke-Groves mechanism (e.g., Vickrey, 1961, Krishna and Perry, 1998) . However, unlike the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, this is a two-round mechanism, where payments made in the signaling round of the mechanism have no direct impact on allocating of the object | these payments in uence the allocation of object indirectly by shaping beliefs about rst period signals.
Ex-ante E cient Equilibrium
The mechanism described above provides an ex-post e cient ex-post equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, agents' payments may depend on the other agents' announcements. Below we show that the E cient Mechanism described in the previous section also has an exante e cient separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, agents make no announcements (or make uninformative announcements) in the cheap talk stage of the mechanism. In the stage 1b they simultaneously make publicly observable payments H i ; an agent decides on the payment size without knowing the private signals of other agents. We show that there exists a fully separating equilibrium where there is a unique payment corresponding to each private signal s i . Consequently, agents no longer need to make announcements, because the announcements of their private signals are revealed in the size of payments they make.
Theorem 5 There exists an e cient equilibrium in the E cient Mechanism, where agents simultaneously make payments H(s i ) that depend only on their private information s i . Equilibrium payments are given by H i (ŝ i ) = E s i h i (ŝ i ; s i ); where h i (ŝ i ; s i ) are equilibrium payments de ned in Lemma 3.
Let us discuss the intuition behind the proof of Theorem 5. According to Theorem 2, an e cient allocation can be obtained, when the rst period signals s i are common knowledge. It remains to show that the signaling mechanism proposed above is incentive compatible when an e cient equilibrium is chosen in the subgame following the signaling stage. Although existence of ex-ante equilibrium follows from existence of an ex-post equilibrium, it is a useful result. It shades some light on the maneuvering that bidders often make prior to an auction: for example, rms preparing to participate in a large-scale privatization auction or competing for a procurement contract might engage in costly signaling in order to discourage potential rivals. For example, let us consider the history of bidding for Los Angeles license in 1995 broadband auction for mobile-phone licenses. 13 One bidder, Paci c Telephone, possibly started with a higher private value than other bidders due to experience in California market and possible synergies between its wireline and wireless businesses. There were a number of important decisions (actions) that each bidder had to make before the auction for Los Angeles license, these included forming alliances, making investments and formulating strategies for other markets. It appears that Paci c Telephone signaled to other bidders (and would-be bidders) that it anticipates winning California. Paci c Telephone made public statements like`If somebody takes California away from us, they'll never make any money'. 14 To make these statement credible, Paci c Telephone made investments that were of little value without winning Los Angeles license 15 . As a result, some potential bidders (including the industry giants such as Bell Atlantic, GTE, and MCI) were discouraged from participating in the auction. (Thus failing to undertake an action, in our interpretation). In fact, GTE and Bell Atlantic took actions that made them ineligible for the auction. 13 We thank Paul Milgrom for suggesting this example of the variable value environment. 14 Wall Street Journal, October 31, 1994. 15 Some of the investments made by Paci c Telephone might be interpreted as actions and others as signals. Essentially, running a PR campaign aimed at signaling that Paci c Telephone is determined to win Los Angeles license can be interpreted as signaling. In contrast, making unobservable arrangements made to expedite creation of the wireless service in Southern California can be interpreted as an action.
As a result, revenues were quite low compared to initial estimates. 16 Applying the logic of our model highlights the importance of signaling that discourages competitors from taking actions that increase the value of the prize for them.
In the above example the costs of making reports credible have not been captured by the auctioneer. There is no reason why bidders would opt to announce their types by writing checks to the auctioneer, and not by burning money in some other way. Another problem is that the game considered above has an ine cient pooling equilibrium along with an e cient separating one. Thus, there is no guarantee that an e cient equilibrium is selected. In the following section we introduce an " e cient mechanism, which is similar to the exante equilibrium considered here, but free of its main disadvantages. First, an " e cient mechanism insures coordination on the e cient equilibrium in the subgame. Second, it allows seller to capture the signaling costs of bidders. The sacri ce that must be made in order to gain robustness and capture signaling costs is an arbitrarily small loss in e ciency.
Robust "-E cient Mechanism
The e cient mechanism described in the previous section can be viewed as a two-stage auction. The reporting stage, where agents simultaneously make payments that reveal their types, can be replaced with a sealed-bid all-pay auction, where the object being sold is worth nothing (zero). Theorem 5 established existence of an e cient Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this two stage auction. Unfortunately, this is not a unique equilibrium: a pooling equilibrium, where everybody bids zero in the signaling stage, is a natural focal point. Nevertheless, introducing an arbitrarily small ine ciency into the auction design can force bidders to coordinate on an e cient separating equilibrium. We will refer to such a mechanism as an " e cient mechanism. We start with describing an " e cient mechanism and then proceed to establish e ciency properties of this mechanism in Theorem 6.
Rounds of " E cient Mechanism 1. The rst (reporting) round takes place at the end of the rst period (after the private signals s have been received by agents, but before agents take actions). In this round one coupon is sold via all pay sealed bid auction. 17 All bids are announced at the end of the round. The coupon sold in the signaling round entitles its owner to a discount of size " for the price in the nal auction (the discount coupon is not-transferable, only the winner of the nal auction can bene t from having the coupon). 2. The second round ( nal) auction takes place at the end of the third period, after agents observe private signals v: In the second round the ownership of the object is assigned using a second price sealed bid auction. (If the highest bidder in the nal round is the owner of the " coupon, then she pays the second highest bid minus ".)
There are two rounds and three decision nodes in an "-e cient mechanism. At the rst decision node, agents make bids in an all-pay auction, i.e. the i's actions space is fH i jH i 0g. The information set of agent i at the rst decision node is given by s i : The rst round strategy is described by the probability distribution i ( ; s i ) over the set of pure strategies fH i jH i 0g. At the second decision node, agents make a decision to act or not to act. The information set of agent i at the second decision node is given by (s i ; H i ; H i ; w), where w is an N-dimensional vector with w k = 1 if the agent k won the coupon in the all pay auction, and w k = 0 otherwise. (There is a unique vector w consistent with vector of payments H; unless there is a tie). The probability that agent i acts (a i = 1) is denoted by i = i (s i ; H i ; H i ; w): At the third decision node, agents submit bids in the second price sealed-bid auction. At this moment, the information sets are (s i ; H i ; H i ; w; a i ; t i ). It is well known that in an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies of a private value Vickrey auction bidders bid their true values. Thus, equilibrium bids are given by V (s i ; t i )+ba i +"w i .
Clearly, an "-e cient mechanism has multiple equilibria. Some of these equilibria are highly implausible. In order to rule out such equilibria we introduce a restriction on strategies in the spirit of`intuitive' criteria such as D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987) or stability of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) .
De nition. A strategy of an agent j is monotonic, if two vectors H j and H 0 j di er only 17 In an all pay sealed bid auction every agent submits a sealed bid. All agents have to pay the amount of their bids regardless of whether or not they won the object. The agent with the highest bid receives the object. (In case of a tie the winner is randomly chosen from the set of highest bidders.) Fullerton and McAfee (1999) use an all-pay auction in their 'contestant selection auction'. in component i so that H i > H 0 i ; then p j (s j ; H j ; H j ; w) p j (s j ; H j ; H 0 j ; w 0 ).
In words, a monotonic strategy of an agent j assumes that for any history, the probability that the agent j takes an action is non-increasing in the size of the payment that some agent i; i 6 = j makes in the signaling stage.
As we will see, the requirement that the strategies are monotonic rules out the`bizarre' equilibrium, where all agents bid zero in the signaling stage and an agent who bids a positive amount is perceived to be of the lowest type. Basically, there are two reasons why an equilibrium strategy may not be monotonic: First, perverse beliefs may sustain an equilibrium in strategies that are not monotonic. An example of such`unnatural' beliefs is as follows: The more an agent bids for a discount coupon, the lower is her perceived s i . Obviously, this is counter-intuitive: the higher is an agent's s i ; the more she values the discount coupon. The second possibility stems from coordination aspect of the game. If bids in the signaling stage are used as coordination devices for selecting a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the remaining subgame, an equilibrium resulting from these beliefs may include strategies that are not monotonic.
De nition. A robust equilibrium of an " e cient mechanism is any symmetric subgameperfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in monotonic strategies.
Theorem 6 For an "-e cient mechanism, the following is true: (i) There exists a robust equilibrium.
(ii) The robust equilibrium is unique. (iii) The probability that the robust equilibrium yields an e cient allocation converges to one as " ! 0:
Before proceeding to a formal proof, let us sketch the intuition behind this result. A pooling equilibrium where everybody bids zero for the coupon is not robust. Indeed, if everybody bids zero for the discount, it can be purchased for an arbitrarily small amount. Thus, the pooling equilibrium is sustainable only if bidders are discouraged from bidding a positive amount by a belief that a positive bid would encourage other bidders to act more aggressively in the action stage. However, this belief is inconsistent with strategies being monotonic. The same argument applies to any partially pooling equilibrium. We show that there are no equilibria in mixed strategies, because the willingness to pay for the discount is an increasing function of the bidder's signal. E ciency of a robust equilibrium follows from Theorem 5 that establishes that for " = 0; there exists an e cient symmetric equilibrium. To prove asymptotic e ciency of a robust equilibrium, we show that when " approaches 0; the robust equilibrium converges to the equilibrium described in Theorem 5. 18 Proof of Theorem 6.
(i) The proof of existence follows the pattern of the proof of Theorem 3. Construction of an ex-ante equilibrium in the previous section used existence of an ex-post equilibrium in a mechanism, where credibility payments are allowed to be functions of announcements. Here, we use the same idea. As an intermediate step, consider a mechanism, where the discount is not auctioned o using an all-pay auction. Instead, bidders announce their types in the reporting stage (much like in the mechanism described in Section 3). After the announcement, bidders make payments h i (b s i ;b s i ) to make the announcement credible, and the bidder with the highest announced s i receives the " discount.
Rounds of the \intermediate" mechanism: we can write Ee i (s i ;ŝ i ; s i ) = E i (e s i ; b e s i ;e s i ).
To prove that a separating equilibrium exists, we need to formulate an increasingdi erences condition similar to (2). 
To prove the claim, we need to consider three cases: (a) the agent wins the " discount if she makes announcementŝ 0 i but notŝ i ; (b) an agent wins the discount for either announcement s 0 i orŝ i ; (c) neitherŝ 0 i ; norŝ i are high enough to win the discount. Using Lemma A3 (from the Appendix) completes the proof of (5).
Since (5) holds, there exists an ex-post separating equilibrium in the \intermediate mechanism". Using existence of an ex-post equilibrium, we can apply the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 5 to establish existence of ex-ante separating signaling mechanism, where agents make signaling payments that are strictly increasing in their signals. This completes the proof of existence. Now we shall prove that any robust equilibrium is unique, fully separating, and 'almost e cient'.
In an equilibrium, the probability of any particular bid value H in the signaling stage is zero. Indeed, if there is a positive mass of agents that plays some H mass with positive probability, then there is a positive probability of a tie. Then an agent playing H mass can increase the likelihood of winning the discount " > 0 by increasing her bid by an in nitesimal amount. Since the strategies are monotonic, none of the agents would increase their likelihood of taking actions. Thus, such a deviation would be pro agent with a rst period signal s i acts with positive probability p i (H i ; H i (s i ); s i ) > 0; then any agent with a signal s 0 i > s i strictly prefers to act, and p i (H i ; H i (s 0 i ); s 0 i ) = 1. Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium in the subgame that is consistent with a robust equilibrium strategy pro le. In this equilibrium, all agents with private values exceeding some critical value s (H) act.
From the previous paragraph and Theorem 2, it follows that " e cient mechanism yields an e cient allocation with probability converging to one as " converges to zero.
To establish uniqueness of the robust equilibrium, we use a standard argument (e.g., Klemperer, 1999) . Condition (6) implies that dH(s) ds is the same in any robust equilibrium. In
Step 5, we showed that there is a unique robust equilibrium in the subgame following the all-pay auction. It remains to show that H(0) = 0: Suppose otherwise, say H(0) = H 0 > 0: For a player with s i = 0, H(0) = 0 is a pro table deviation: Indeed, after this she does not change the perception of her type (she is correctly perceived to have s i = 0). It was demonstrated that in a robust equilibrium each player either acts with probability one or zero (except perhaps for a set of measure zero). Thus, the deviation can only cause other players to increase the probability with which they act; however, given the set of players that act, non of the players that do not act in a robust equilibrium would choose to act.
Let us now consider an example illustrating that the all pay auction part of the "-e cient mechanism is crucial for ensuring that any robust equilibrium is separating and nearly e cient.
Example. Suppose the all-pay auction is replaced with a second-price sealed-bid auction.
When a su ciently small discount is auctioned o via a second price auction, the following ine cient pooling equilibrium is robust: all agents bid " for the discount of size ": Indeed, we need to specify beliefs that support this equilibrium. If an agent deviates by bidding less than "; she is perceived to have the lowest possible signal s i : Thus, there are no incentives to bid less than "; provided that " is su ciently small. If an agent bids more than "; the beliefs of other agents about her type are the same as if she bids ": Thus, bidding more than " is a bad strategy: If there are N agents bidding " each in a second-price auction, each of them has a 1 N chance of getting the discount. The winner of the discount \envy" the bidders who did not win the discount, and thus do not have to pay anything in the signaling stage. By bidding more than "; an agent insures that she wins the discount and will have to pay for it, thus, making herself worse o . In contrast, there are no robust pooling equilibrium of the "-e cient mechanism (by Theorem 6). For instance, if all agents bid " for the discount, bidding slightly more than " is a pro table deviation.
Conclusion
Our model captures essential features of the variable value environment. The model describes the sale of an object available for use at some future date (such as a military base scheduled to close in twenty years). Suppose several rms from di erent industries are considering buying the base in order to convert it into a manufacturing facility. In this case, investments complementary with ownership of the base are modeled as actions and demand shocks, and unexpected developments in bidder's business are modeled as exogenous shocks. We put forth an e cient mechanism for allocating an object in such environment (Theorems 3 and 6). At least in theory, the "-e cient auction proposed herein has several important advantages under this environment. First, it has a unique robust equilibrium. Second, this equilibrium yields e cient allocation with near certainty (see Theorem 6). An "-e cient auction seems simple and intuitive enough to have viable practical applications; it might be a rst real-world example of 'virtual implementation'. Albeit, no amount of theorizing can guarantee that it performs well with human decision makers. Thus, comparison of "-e cient auction and other types of auctions may be a high pay-o project for an experimental economist. Note that "-e cient auction is preferable to a Vickrey auction even if it is not certain whether or not the environment has a variable value component. Indeed, Vickrey auction is a subgame of "-e cient auction. In general, a fully separating equilibrium collapses, if the rst period signals have a large common value component. 19 In the extreme case where no information revelation takes place in the signaling round an "-e cient auction yields a negligibly small loss in e ciency relative to one round Vickrey auction. However, as long as information revelation occurs in the signaling round of the "-e cient auction, the additional information is likely to improve performance of the Vickrey auction conducted in the second round relative to a standard Vickrey auction. It is straightforward to show that "-e cient auction is e cient in independent private value environment. Obviously, in an independent private value case using a simpler e cient mechanism is more practical. However, it is reassuring that using "-e cient auction does no harm even if the environment has no variable value features. In short, "-e cient auction seem to o er substantial bene ts with a minimum downside.
The model considered in this paper is su ciently rich to o er insight into understanding of the variable value environment. However, many important examples of the variable environment may be better captured by variations of our models. Markets where search matters are a particularly signi cant examples of the variable value environment. The theory of the variable value environment developed herein explains why sellers in such an environment are reluctant to use auctions. Indeed, we established that in the variable value environment (e.g. the housing market) standard auction mechanisms, such as Vickrey auction or rst price auction, are ine cient. The signaling mechanism and "-e cient auction proposed in this paper inform our intuition for mechanism design in the variable value environments ranging from market for capital equipment to the housing market. Proof of Lemma 1. Let e a be a vector of actions with e a j = e a k = 0 and e a i = a i = a 0 i for all i 6 = j; k: Lemma A4 yields that V (s j ; T j ) V (s k ; T k ) whenever s j s k : Now one can use Lemma A3 with the constant be a j = be a k .
Proof of Lemma 2. Let Z = max j6 =i fV (s j ; t j ) + ba j g); and X = V (s i ; t i ): By de nition, g i (s; a i ) = E(X + b Z) + E(X Z) + :
Using the formula maxfx; yg = (x y) + + y, we get First, we prove that the agent i has no incentives to under-report her rst-period signal, i.e. to reportŝ i < s i : Consider incentives the agent i with the rst-period signal s i (k) faces. For any " such that s i (k) s i (k + 1) > " > 0; she is indi erent between reporting s i (k) and reporting s i (k) ": Indeed, the 'credibility payment' is the same and the number of acting rivals is the same (k + 1). The condition (2) but this is true by (2). Since the agent i having the signal s i is indi erent between reporting s i and reporting any signal that is larger than s i (k) and does not exceed s i ; the proof that the agent i has no incentives to under-report her signal is complete.
The proof that there is no incentives to over-report the signal is somewhat symmetric. The s i agent is indi erent between reporting the true signal and reporting s i (k 1): Indeed, the mechanism assumes that the agents with reports s i and s i (k 1) pay the same amount. Now, for any " such that s i (k 2) s i (k 1) > " > 0; the agent with s i (k 1) is indi erent between reporting the true signal and reporting s i (k 1) + ": To see this, note that E i ( s i (k 1); a(k)) h i ( s i (k 1)) = E i ( s i (k 1); a(k 1)) h i ( s i (k 1)) E i ( s i (k 1); a(k 1)) + E i ( s i (k 1); a(k)):
By (2), E i ( s i (k 1); a(k 1)) E i ( s i (k 1); a(k)) E i (s i ; a(k 1)) E i (s i ; a(k)):
Thus, if the s i (k 1) is indi erent between reporting the truth and reporting s i (k 1) + "; the s i -agent (weakly) prefers to report s i (k 1) (which is pay-o equivalent to reporting the truth), than to report s i (k 1) + ": To show, thatŝ i would not exceed s i (k 2); one should consider the incentives the s i (k 2)-agent faces, etc. Therefore, the agent i has no incentives to over-report her rst-period signal.
